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Balkans
X A V I E R B O U G A R E L
The appearance of Muslim populations in the Balka-
ns dates back to the presence of the Ottoman Empire
in the region (14th century Ð beginning of the 20th
century) and is due to the conversion of local popula-
tions to Islam (essentially Albanians and Slavs) or to
the settlement of Turkic-speaking Muslim popula-
tions from Anatolia.
The New
Balkan Islam
In the early 1990s, the number of Muslims in
the Balkans was estimated at 8,250,000, or
approximately 13% of the total Balkan pop-
ulation. Muslims represented the main reli-
gious community in Albania (approximately
70%) and in Bosnia-Herzegovina (45%), an
important minority in Macedonia (30%), in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (20%,
concentrated in Kosovo and in the Sandjak)
and in Bulgaria (12.5 %), and a small minori-
ty in Greece (1.5%) and in Rumania (0.2%).
They were divided into three main groups,
namely the Albanian Muslims (4,350,000, in
Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia), the Bosn-
ian Muslims (2,350,000, in Bosnia-Herzegov-
ina, in the Sandjak and in Kosovo) and the
Turks (1,050,000 in Bulgaria, Macedonia,
Greece et Rumania), to which other smaller
groups can be added: Muslim Romas spread
all over the Peninsula, Slavic-speaking Mus-
lims in Bulgaria (Pomak) and Macedonia
(Torbesh), and Turkish-speaking Tatars in
the Dobrudja (Rumania).
From the Turks of Bulgaria in 1989 to the
Albanians of Kosovo ten years later, not to
mention the Bosnian Muslims between
1992 and 1995, Balkan Muslims figure
amongst the main victims of the forced de-
portations and the massacres that have
marked the region in the last decade. These
dramatic events were presented in a rather
simplified manner: whereas some raised the
menace of a 'green diagonal' linking fanati-
cized Muslim populations, others presented
Balkan Islam as a haven of tolerance threat-
ened by an orthodox Crusade. In both cases,
the internal diversity and the recent trans-
formations of Balkan Islam were neglected,
even denied. These two points are thus in-
sisted upon here by demonstrating that the
Muslim populations are not only victims,
but also actors in the current Balkan crisis.
The political awakening of
Balkan Muslims
Indeed, the emergence of the Balkan Mus-
lim populations as autonomous political ac-
tors is one of the most important develop-
ments of the last decade. In the interwar pe-
riod, these populations remained withdrawn
into their religious identity and their reli-
gious institutions, and maintained a clien-
telistic and obedient relationship to the new
Balkan states. Only the Muslims of Bosnia-
Herzegovina had their own political party.
Communist modernization allowed for a
cristallization of Albanian, Bosnian Muslim or
Turkish national identities as well as the
emergence of new secularized Muslim elites
(teachers, physicians, etc.), but it was not
until the 1980s that the first mass mobiliza-
tions of Muslim populations were to occur in
favour of a 'Republic of Kosovo' (in 1981 and
then in 1989-90) or against the brutal assim-
ilation campaign of the Bulgarian commu-
nist party between 1984 and 1989.
After the collapse of the communist
regimes in 1989-90, the mobilization of the
Muslim populations resulted not only in the
constituting of political parties in all Balkan
states, but also in the formulation of nation-
al claims Ð going as far as demands for an in-
dependent state (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Koso-
vo) or an autonomous territory (Macedonia,
Sandjak). It should, however, be noted that
this wave of national claims amongst the
Muslim Balkan populations is for the most
part reactive: the awakening of an intolerant
and aggressive Serb nationalism, in particu-
lar, has largely contributed to the desires for
independence of the Bosnian Muslims and
the Kosovo Albanians. Inversely, the end of
the forced assimilation of Turks in Bulgaria
and the recognition of their political and cul-
tural rights explain the moderation of their
political leaders and their progressive inte-
gration into Bulgarian political life.
Likewise, throughout the Balkan countries,
this political mobilization of the Muslim pop-
ulations was accompanied by the reshaping
of the relationship between national identity
and religious identity. In Bosnia-Herzegov-
ina, the Party of Democratic Action (SDA)
constituted itself around a pan-Islamist
movement that had appeared at the end of
the 1930s, and of which the main figure is
Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic himself.
Elsewhere, the parties representing the Mus-
lim populations were created by members of
the new secularized elites which had ap-
peared during the communist period. In
general, however, national identity and reli-
gious identity tended to come closer togeth-
er. This tendency is most clear in Bosnia-
Herzegovina where, paradoxically enough,
the replacement of the national term 'Mus-
lim' by that of 'Bosniak' was coupled with an
increased insistence upon Islam as a found-
ing factor of national Muslim/Bosniak identi-
ty, and a bringing to the fore of the religious
dimensions of the war (cult of chehids Ð mar-
tyrs of faith, evocations of jihad Ð holy war Ð
and creation of re-Islamized 'Muslim
brigades' within the Bosnian army).
Amongst the Turks (Bulgaria, Macedonia,
Greece) and the Albanians (Albania, Kosovo,
Macedonia), the re-Islamization of national
identity remains more limited and discrete.
In the Turkish case, the transformations of
identity currently taking place reflect the de-
bate which, in Turkey itself, occurs between
the partisans of Kemalist secularism and
those of a 'Turko-Islamic synthesis'. In the Al-
banian case, the classical nationalist ideolo-
gy of the 19th century, incarnated today by
such intellectuals as Ismal Kadare or Ibrahim
Rugova, is characterized by its rejection of
Islam and the Turko-Ottoman heritage.
Nowadays, however, it has to compete with
a new 'Islamo-nationalist' ideology that
seeks to associate national Albanian identity
and Muslim religious identity, by presenting
the conversion of Albanians to Islam as a de-
fence mechanism in the face of assimilation
efforts of the orthodox Greeks and Serbs.
The paradoxes of re-Islamization
Nevertheless, this re-Islamization of
Balkan Muslim national identities should in
no case be conceived as linear and based on
consensus: on the contrary, it is accompa-
nied by virulent conflicts within each com-
munity and appears to be paradoxical in
several ways. First of all, this re-Islamization
of collective identities does not really re-
verse the results of a half century of author-
itarian modernization and secularization.
Following the re-establishment of religious
freedoms, the Islamic religious institutions
were of course able to resume some reli-
gious activities (opening of mosques and re-
ligious schools, resumption of Sufi pilgrim-
ages, etc.), but nowhere they were able to
recuperate legal competencies (sharia
courts) or real estate (waqfs) which had
been taken away after the war. Even in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the tight collaboration
between the state apparatus and religious
Islamic institutions did not result in a true
religious revival, but on the contrary in a
strong resistance to the attempts of the SDA
at re-Islamizing everyday life.
The Bosnian example also shows that the
arrival in the Balkans of mudjahidin and Is-
lamic humanitarian organizations did not
lead to an 'Iranization' or a 'Saudization' of
society, but rather to a widespread incom-
prehension and multiple incidents between
the local population and foreign preachers.
More generally, the development of new
links between Balkan Islam and the rest of
the Muslim world has favoured the renewal
of religious activities (translation and edi-
tion of religious literature, opening of
mosques or religious schools, sending of
students to Islamic universities in the Mus-
lim world, etc.), but also has confronted offi-
cial religious institutions with new competi-
tors supported by various Muslim states
(Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, etc.) or re-Is-
lamization movements. It has thus con-
tributed to the internal pluralization of
Balkan Islam and compelled the Balkan Mus-
lim populations to better define the fea-
tures of an 'European Islam' which is largely
yet to be invented.
Although Islam remains at the founda-
tions of the Muslim collective identities,
faith itself is thus becoming increasingly in-
dividualized, and the renewal of certain col-
lective and ostentatious forms of religious
practice should not mask a strong tendency
towards secularization shared with all other
European populations. u
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